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Abstract
What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its
derivation. Keeping to this maxim, we record a paradigmatic shift in
the foundations of quantum mechanics, where the focus has recently from
interpreting to reconstructing quantum theory. Several historic and con-
temporary reconstructions are analyzed, including the ones due to Hardy,
Rovelli, and Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. We conclude by discussing the
importance of a novel concept of intentionally incomplete reconstruction.
1 What is wrong with interpreting quantumme-
chanics?
Ever since the first days of quantum mechanics physicists as well as philoso-
phers tried to interpret it, understanding this task as a problem of giving to
the new physical theory a clear meaning. One of the principal reasons why one
has always felt the need for interpretations has to do with the puzzling aspect
of the formalism of quantum mechanics, usually referred to as the measure-
ment problem. Reversible unitary evolution of the wave function, according to
standard quantum mechanics, at the moment of measurement is replaced by an
irreversible transformation known as wavefunction collapse. First and foremost,
interpretations of quantum mechanics aimed at making sense of this surprising
change in the theory’s dynamics, sometimes taking the collapse at face value and
claiming its fundamental irreducible role, or sometimes going to another extreme
and denying the collapse altogether. However, looking globally, the enterprize
of interpreting quantum mechanics failed: today we still have no consensus on
what the meaning of quantum theory is. None of the proposed answers has won
overall acceptance. Perhaps the most remarkable manifestation of the failure to
interpret quantum mechanics is the attitude taught to most young physicists in
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lecture rooms and research laboratories in the last half century, “Shut up and
calculate!” [37]
Why did attempts at a univocal interpretation fail? Many answers are pos-
sible, and among them we favor two, both showing that there is an intrinsic
deficiency in the idea of interpreting a physical theory with the help of philo-
sophical instruments only.
The first answer is that to a physical theory one would naturally like to give
a physical meaning in the Greek sense of ϕυ´σις, i.e. we—as part of the physi-
cists’ audience—expect to be told a true story about nature. This is because we
casually tend to apply physical theory to the phenomenal world to learn some-
thing about the latter, and not the world to physical theory in order to invent
a meaning of the theory. Physical theory is above all a tool for predicting the
yet unobserved phenomena; so employing existing knowledge and experience of
the world to interpret physics runs counter to its basic function as a scientific
theory. However, notwithstanding such an against-the-grain direction in which
a philosophical interpretation operates, the former does not necessarily lead to
formal contradiction that would invalidate the interpretation program logically;
more modestly but perhaps no less irritatingly, at the end one is often left with
a feeling of being excluded from mainstream research. Further, as the physics of
today is inseparable from mathematics, a meaning cannot be physical and thus
satisfactory if it is merely heaped over and above the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics, instead of coming all the way along with the formalism
as it rises in a derivation of the theory.
The second answer is that we live in a situation where objective truth has
been appropriated by science, and to pass public ratification every increase in
knowledge must confront experimental setups. In this world an interpretation
can only be considered satisfactory when it becomes an integral part of science.
This is not unprecedented in the history of ideas: indeed, many philosophical
questions with the advent of empirical science ceased to be perceived as philo-
sophical and are now treated as scientific. Even such a pronounced critic of
the idea that physics can have implications for philosophy as Steven Weinberg
2
admits that, exceptionally, physics and philosophy can be connected in that
“discoveries in physics sometimes reveal that topics that had been thought to
be proper subjects for philosophical argument actually belong in the province of
ordinary science” [57]. To be able to convince Weinberg and many of those sci-
entists who remain sceptical about the philosophical debate over interpretations
of quantum mechanics, the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics must be
moved into the area of science; only then will the puzzling discord disappear.
2 Reconstruction of physical theory
2.1 Schema
We call reconstruction the following schema adopted to the needs of quantum
theory and different from the notion of rational reconstruction introduced by
Carnap [9]. Theorems and major results of physical theory are formally derived
from simpler mathematical assumptions. These assumptions or axioms, in turn,
appear as a representation in the formal language, of a set of physical princi-
ples. Thus, reconstruction consists of three stages: first give a set of physical
principles, then formulate their mathematical representation, and finally derive
from here the formalism of the theory.
Contrary to the case of interpretation, the three-stage structure of recon-
struction permits the latter to acquire supplementary persuasive power which
arises from the use of mathematical derivation. Established as valid mathemat-
ical results, theorems and equations of the theory become unquestionable and
free of suspicion. ‘Why is it so?’—‘Because we derived it.’ The question of
meaning, previously asked with regard to the formalism, is removed and now
bears, if at all, only on the selection of the principles. No room for mystery
remains in what concerns the meaning of the theory’s mathematical apparatus.
As one of the consequences, in the reconstruction program the measurement
problem loses the central role it has occupied for the success of an interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics. In reconstruction, one makes sense of all of the
formalism on the basis of first principles, and whatever mathematical element
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is contained in the formalism that is used in a particular reconstruction, this
element becomes meaningful thanks to the first principles.
Explanatory power of the reconstruction is a power of explanation of where
the structure of the theory comes from; not necessarily a power of explanation
by the theory, of the real world. Traditionally, interpretations focused on the
latter task and gave less attention to the former one. Reconstruction shifts this
focus area: its added value for better understanding quantum theory originates
in the new insights into the structure of the theory, made possible thanks to the
use of mathematical derivation.
2.2 Selection of the first principles
Anyone who wishes to attempt a reconstruction of physical theory must formu-
late the foundational principles which he or she believes plausible and translate
them into mathematical axioms. Then the rest of the theory will be constructed
‘mechanically,’ by means of a formal derivation. The choice of axioms must be
the only allowed freedom in the whole construction. It is commonplace to say
that it is not easy to exhibit an axiomatic system that would stand to such
requirements, especially in the case of quantum theory.
First, where do candidate axioms for quantum theory come from and how
does one judge which statements that can plausibly be taken as axioms? Prior
to pronouncing such a judgment, one must develop an intuition of what is plau-
sible about quantum theory and what is not. This can only be achieved by
practicing the theory, i.e. by taking its prescriptions at face value, applying
them to systems under consideration in particular tasks, and obtaining results.
In short, one needs to acquire a real ‘know-how’ above and beyond the theo-
retical knowledge that quantum mechanics could solve such and such problems.
Researcher’s intuition develops from experience; it cannot arise from abstract
knowledge ‘in principle.’
However, taking the prescriptions of quantum theory at face value, apply-
ing them and obtaining results will not yet make things clear about quantum
mechanics. Indeed, one can possess the knowledge about how to apply a cer-
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tain tool without caring about the structure of the tool nor its meaning. The
quantum mechanical know-how serves purely as such a tool for developing one’s
intuition about which candidate idea is a plausible foundational principle and
which other candidate idea will not pass the test. Candidate foundational prin-
ciples need not even be theorems of the already existing quantum mechanics:
one’s judgment may be such that a new statement—false or only conditionally
true in quantum theory—will be taken as axiom in reconstruction of a new
theory. Examples of such principles will be investigated in Section 3.5.
Second, what shall we require from first principles? They must be simple
physical statements, i.e. assertions whose meaning is immediately, easily acces-
sible to a scientist’s understanding. They must also be such as to permit a clear
and unambiguous translation of themselves into mathematically formulated ax-
ioms. A derivation of quantum theory will then rely on these axioms.
2.3 Status of the first principles
A reconstruction program includes a derivation of quantum theory, but in the
previous section one was told to apply and use it in order to motivate the
derivation. Is there a vicious circle here? We submit that there is none, and this
thanks to the status of the first principles. Namely, they should not necessarily
be viewed as ultimate truths about nature. Independently of one’s ontological
commitments, the first principles have only a minimal epistemic status of being
postulated for the purpose of reconstructing the theory in question. As with
the 19th-century mathematics, in theoretical physics the axiomatic method is
to be separated from the attitude which the Greeks had toward axioms: that
they represent the truth about reality. Much of the progress of mathematics is
due to understanding that an axiom can no longer be considered an ultimate
truth, but merely a basic structural element, i.e. an assumption that lies at the
foundation of a certain theoretical structure. In mathematics, after departing
from the Greek concept of axiom, “not only geometry, but many other, even very
abstract, theories have been axiomatized, and the axiomatic method has become
a powerful tool for mathematical research, as well as a means of organizing the
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immense field of mathematical knowledge which thereby can be made more
surveyable” [26]. A similar attitude is to be taken with respect to axioms used
for the formal derivation of a physical theory. To give a concise formula, a
methodological prescription that gives the minimal status of the first principles
in a reconstruction program, runs as follows:
• If the theory itself does not tell you that the states of the system, or any
other variables, are ontic, then do not take them to be ontic.
To explain the above prescription, return first to the idea that, in developing
an intuition with respect to the plausibility of the foundational principles used
to derive a theory, one takes this theory as a given and applies it practically, so
as to acquire a know-how that would justify the choice of principles. Now, when
one is working with several physical theories, ideas that have previously been
used as foundational in theory I, may turn out to be derivative (i.e., theorems) in
theory II. Examples include the case of thermodynamics and statistical physics
or the relation between macroscale hydrodynamics and the low-level molecular
theory of liquids. Such considerations show the limits of philosophical assump-
tions that one can make about the status of the first principles used in the
reconstruction of a given physical theory. Indeed, generically nothing can be
said about their ontological content or the ontic commitments that arise from
the principles. It is more economical and would amount to a certain episte-
mological modesty to treat the foundational principles as axioms hic et nunc,
i.e. in a given theoretical description. Epistemological modesty requires that
one brackets his or her personal motivation for the choice of first principles and
reconstructs the theory based on the principles themselves. Reconstruction be-
comes meaningful solely thanks to the sense of the first principles on which it
is based.
Reconstruction of a physical theory has its main advantage compared to
philosophical interpretation of the theory in the fact that it moves a number of
questions, previously thought of as philosophical, to the realm of science, and
this in virtue of the mathematical derivation which the reconstruction program
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operates. However, philosophical problems do not altogether disappear; they
still apply to the first principles and take the form of a problem of their jus-
tification. Evidently, it is a minimal logical condition that such a justification
should not be seen as a mathematical deduction of the principles from the theory
in whose very foundations they lie. Once one has obtained a full formalism of
the theory in an epistemologically modest reconstruction, it is then possible to
ask the reconstructed theory itself if it allows a realist interpretation of the first
principles from which it has been derived or, perhaps, it imposes constraints
on possible ontological commitments. And while in general the status of the
first principles as ultimate truths about reality is not a necessity, certain recon-
struction programs are such that this status can be safely, or almost, attributed
to the principles within a particular reconstruction in question. The task of
justification is therefore external to the reconstruction program and must be
executed by one with a different set of presuppositions, i.e. by taking the the-
ory as a given and motivating from there why the principles that were involved
in the reconstruction are simple, physical, and plausible. Therefore, philosophy
is not fully chased out of physics. On the contrary, by demarcating the fron-
tier between what can be treated as a scientific question and what belongs to
metatheory, one contributes to a better understanding of the structure of the
theory and of those of its foundational postulates which require a metatheoretic
interpretation and justification.
It is often claimed that applying to theoretical physics the same methodology
as in axiomatizations in mathematics leads to a problem, exposed by Einstein.
While supporting the axiomatic move in mathematics in that it “dispels the ob-
scurity which formerly surrounded the principles,” Einstein argues that if one
wants to apply a similar move in physics, then one has to face the difficulty of
connecting “conceptual schemata” with “real objects” [13]. Applied to an epis-
temologically modest reconstruction, this problem is no more than apparent, if
the status of the first principles is properly freed from ontological commitments.
The latter do have a bearing indeed, but only on justifying the choice of postu-
lates. Starting from a particular set of principles (stage 1) represented formally
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(stage 2), mathematical derivation (stage 3) proceeds in exactly the same way as
in mathematics. Reconstruction understood as stages 1-3 is therefore analogous
to an axiomatization in mathematics. However, unlike mathematical axiomati-
zation, the reconstruction program also invokes the problem of justification of
the choice of first principles. But when the first principles are formulated in an
epistemologically modest way, Einstein’s “conceptual schemata,” or structural
elements of physical theory, become the only building blocks of the latter. Un-
ambiguous derivation of the theory’s formalism is detached from the question
of reality of the world that the theory describes, with respect to which one is
free to take different viewpoints. For quantum theory, this detachment amounts
to operating a reconstruction of quantum theory from a set of first principles
devoid of the necessity of being justified on the ontological grounds.
3 Examples of reconstruction
3.1 Early examples of reconstruction
In the last decade reconstruction has become a major trend in the foundations
of quantum mechanics. Before describing this recent work, let us first look
further back in the history of quantum mechanics: there too axiomatic deriva-
tions occupy an eminent place. The first paper where quantum mechanics was
treated axiomatically appeared shortly after the creation of quantum mechanics
itself: in 1927 Hilbert, von Neumann and Nordheim stated their view of quan-
tum mechanics as one in which “. . . [the theory’s] analytical apparatus, and
the arithmetic quantities occurring in it, receives on the basis of the physical
postulates a physical interpretation. Here, the aim is to formulate the physical
requirements so completely that the analytical apparatus is just uniquely de-
termined. Thus the route is of axiomatization” [27, our emphasis]. It is on this
route of axiomatization that von Neumann in collaboration with Birkhoff was
led to study the logic of quantum mechanics [6]. Following their work, many ax-
iomatic systems were proposed, e.g. by Zieler [58], Varadarajan [54, 55], Piron
[39, 40], Kochen and Specker [31], Guenin [19], Gunson [20], Jauch [29], Pool
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[44, 45], Plymen [43], Marlow [36], Beltrametti and Casinelli [4], Holland [28],
or Ludwig [33]. Another branch of axiomatic quantum theory, the algebraic ap-
proach was first conceived by Jordan, von Neumann and Wigner [30] and later
developed by Segal [48, 49], Haag and Kastler [21], Plymen [42], Emch [14] and
others; for a recent review, see [8].
However, a vast majority of these axiomatic developments do not fall under
our notion of reconstruction, as they were based on highly abstract mathemati-
cal assumptions and not, as we require, on simple physical principles. Consider
for instance the exemplary work by Mackey [34, 35]. He develops quantum me-
chanics as follows. Take a set B of all Borel subsets of the real line and suppose
we are given two abstract sets O (a to-be space of observables) and S (a to-be
space of states) and a (to-be probability) function p which assigns a real number
0 ≤ p(x, f,M) ≤ 1 to each triple x, f,M , where x is in O, f is in S, and M is
in B. Assume certain properties of p listed in axioms M1-M9:
M1 Function p is a probability measure. Mathematically, we have p(x, f, ∅) =
0, p(x, f,R) = 1, and p(x, f,M1∪M2∪M3 . . .) =
∑∞
n=1 p(x, f,Mn) when-
ever the Mn are Borel sets that are disjoint in pairs.
M2 Two states, in order to be different, must assign different probability dis-
tributions to at least one observable; and two observables, in order to be
different, must have different probability distributions in at least one state.
Mathematically, if p(x, f,M) = p(x′, f,M) for all f in S and all M in B
then x = x′; and if p(x, f,M) = p(x, f ′,M) for all x in O and all M in B
then f = f ′.
M3 Let x be any member of O and let u be any real bounded Borel func-
tion on the real line. Then there exists y in O such that p(y, f,M) =
p(x, f, u−1(M)) for all f in S and all M in B.
M4 If f1, f2,. . . are members of S and λ1+λ2+ . . . = 1 where 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1, then
there exists f in S such that p(x, f,M) =∑∞n=1 λnp(x, fn,M) for all x in
O and M in B.
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M5 Call question an observable e in O such that p(e, f, {0, 1}) = 1 for all f in
S. Questions e and e′ are disjoint if e ≤ 1− e′. Then a question ∑∞n=1 en
exists for any sequence (en) of questions such that em and en are disjoint
whenever n 6= m.
M6 If E is any compact, question-valued measure then there exists an observ-
able x in O such that χM (E) = E(M) for all M in B, where χM is a
characteristic function of M.
M7 The partially ordered set of all questions in quantum mechanics is isomor-
phic to the partially ordered set of all closed subspaces of a separable,
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
M8 If e is any question different from 0 then there exists a state f in S such
that mf (e) = 1.
M9 For each sequence (fn) of members of S and each sequence (λn) of non-
negative real numbers whose sum is 1, one-parameter time evolution group
Vt : S 7→ S acts as follows: Vt (
∑∞
n=1 λnfn) =
∑∞
n=1 λnVt(fn) for all t ≥ 0;
and for all x in O, f in S, and M in B, t→ p(x, Vt(f),M) is continuous.
In Mackey’s nine axioms all essential features of the quantum formalism
are directly postulated in their mathematical form: the Hilbert space structure
in M5-M8, the state space and probabilistic interpretation in M1-M4, and the
time evolution in M9. The list of axioms is long and their meaning is far
from transparent; indeed, at no point is one given an intuition as to where
these mathematical definitions come from or how one justifies them on physical
rather than formal grounds. In fact, Mackey’s concern in the early 1950s was
with a precise mathematical axiomatization of quantum mechanics rather than
with the question of what quantum mechanics tells us about the world or with
reconstructing its formalism from the set of such fundamental ideas. Thus,
the first stage of the reconstruction schema, at which one formulates physical
principles, is absent from Mackey’s work, and instead one starts directly at the
second stage where the first principles appear in mathematical form.
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Mackey’s axioms M5-M8 were consequently reformulated in the language of
quantum logic, thereby rephrasing the assumptions that underlie the Hilbert
space structure. This has been the case, most prominently, in [29, 39, 40] and
also in an important state-of-the-art book [4]. Quantum logical assumptions are
simple enough to be accessible for direct comprehension, in contrast to Mackey’s
mathematically formulated axioms, but they tend to be linguistic rather than
physical. This means that one typically argues that it makes no sense to speak
about certain concepts unless some suitable ‘trivial’ properties of these con-
cepts had been postulated, e.g., the notion of proposition is only meaningful
if, as in Ref. [12], negation or partial order, or, as in Ref. [4], implication, are
defined. Although we fully acknowledge that linguistic a priori arguments can
be interesting and powerful, we however separate them from the reconstruction
program as introduced above: in the latter, first principles from which the the-
ory is derived should have a physical meaning, i.e. tell us something directly
and intuitively apprehensible about the world. Such principles, ideally, should
be independent of a particular formalism in which one then derives quantum
theory, and therefore should not rely on the language of quantum logic as just
one among many such formalisms.
3.2 Hardy’s reconstruction
It is startling how Mackey’s and similar axiomatic sets for quantum mechanics
differ from systems of first principles proposed by several contemporary authors.
Although some of these latter ones remain very much in the spirit of earlier pro-
posals of sets of abstract mathematical postulates (e.g., [41]), even in such cases
the author typically feels the need to give a non-technical, physical motivation
for the choice of axioms. Still further on the way to foundational physical prin-
ciples rather than purely mathematical axioms, one finds an interesting example
of reconstruction coming from Hardy’s instrumentalist derivation of quantum
theory [23]. Unlike Mackey who starts with two large abstract sets and an
abstract real-valued function, Hardy’s “five reasonable axioms” set up a link
between two initially introduced natural numbers, K and N . K is the number
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of degrees of freedom of the system and is defined as the minimum number of
probability measurements needed to determine the state. Dimension N is de-
fined as the maximum number of states that can be reliably distinguished from
one another in a single measurement. The axioms then are:
H1 Probabilities. In the limit as n becomes infinite, relative frequencies (mea-
sured by taking the proportion of times a particular outcome is observed)
tend to the same value for any case where a given measurement is per-
formed on an ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation.
H2 Simplicity. K is determined by a function of N where N = 1, 2, . . . and
where, for each given N , K takes the minimum value consistent with the
axioms.
H3 Subspaces. A system whose state is constrained to belong to an M dimen-
sional subspace behaves like a system of dimension M .
H4 Composite systems. A composite system consisting of subsystems A and B
satisfies N = NANB and K = KAKB .
H5 Continuity. There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system
between any two pure states of that system.
Hardy’s list of axioms is considerably shorter and simpler than Mackey’s,
and although four of H1-H5 still use mathematical language in their formulation,
the meaning of the axioms in Hardy’s instrumentalist setting can be grasped
easier than the meaning of Mackey’s M1-M9. In fact, this meaning is already
suggested by the names given to the axioms by Hardy. One can rephrase H1-
H4 into physical principles from which one derives the formalism of the theory.
This would provide for the missing first stage of the reconstruction schema and
thus amount to a complete example of a reconstruction. Thus, at the first stage
of reconstruction, the following physical principles are postulated that rephrase
Hardy’s axioms; they are simple but non-trivial: for H1, assume that probability
can be introduced as relative frequency and it is a well-defined concept obeying
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the laws of probability theory; for H2, assume that the number of parameters
needed to characterize a state is linked in a minimal way to the number of
states that can be distinguished in one measurement, i.e., information carrying
capacity of the system; for H3, that systems that have the same information
carrying capacity have the same properties; for H4, assume multiplicability of
the information carrying capacity. At the second stage of the reconstruction
schema, one formulates these principles mathematically (in Hardy’s way); and,
at the third stage, one uses Hardy’s theorems to derive the full-blown formalism
of quantum mechanics.
The particular instrumental philosophy does not play a crucial role in the
derivation: Hardy himself acknowledges that his axioms can be adopted by a
realist as well as a hidden variable theorist or a partisan of collapse interpreta-
tions. Thus, choice of the underlying philosophy is not critical to the success of
the derivation, and Hardy’s reconstruction advances our understanding of quan-
tum theory irrespectively of the justification which one may have for the axioms.
What matters are the simple physical principles formulated as axioms H1-H4.
This is exactly what one would expect given the status of the first principles.
We shall however see below an opposite example, in which a justification used
for the fundamental principles will limit the area where mathematical derivation
is both applicable and meaningful.
Still, in Hardy’s case it is not so clear whether axiom H5 has a physical
meaning. Because it is this axiom that makes the theory quantum rather than
classical, the reconstruction program cannot be said to be completely imple-
mented. To illustrate this point, we distinguish two types of continuity assump-
tions that are made in axiomatic derivations of quantum theory. Continuity
assumptions of type 1 select the correct type of numeric field which is used in
the construction of the Hilbert space of the theory; namely, of the field C of
complex numbers. Sole`r’s theorem [51] or Zieler’s axioms [58] are examples of
type 1 continuity assumptions. Hardy’s case is different and is an example of
a continuity assumption of type 2, which is ultimately responsible for the ap-
pearance of the superposition principle. Examples of other type 2 assumptions
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include Gleason’s non-contextuality [16], Brukner’s and Zeilinger’s homogene-
ity of parameter space [7], Landsman’s two-sphere property [32], or Holland’s
axioms C and D [28] which bear a particular resemblance to Hardy’s H5:
(C) Superposition principle for pure states:
1. Given two different pure states (atoms) a and b, there is at
least one other pure state c, c 6= a and c 6= b that is a
superposition of a and b.
2. If the pure state c is a superposition of the distinct pure
states a and b, then a is a superposition of b and c.
(D) Ample unitary group: Given any two orthogonal pure states
a, b ∈ L, there is a unitary operator U such that U(a) = b.
We see that various axiomatic systems for quantum theory contain, under one
form or another, the assumption of continuity, and it is this assumption which
is largely responsible for making things quantum. Whatever the framework of
the reconstruction program, bringing in topological considerations is essential.
As it is exceedingly difficult to formulate a physical principle which may provide
a meaning for the continuity assumptions of type 2, all reconstruction programs
that employ them, suffer from intrusion of an element of mathematical abstrac-
tion.
In a more recent reformulation of his axioms [24, 25] Hardy suggests a way
to avoid the mathematically abstract type 2 continuity assumption that he has
previously made in axiom H5. In the new version Hardy maintains H5 without
the word “continuous”:
H5′ Reversibility. There exists a reversible transformation on a system between
any two pure states of that system.
It is then hypothesized that this new reversibility axiom, which is strictly weaker
than the former H5, if combined together with axiom H3 about the structure
of subspaces, will allow one to derive continuity in any finite-dimensional space.
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The idea is to build on the fact that a limited number of finite groups is avail-
able in low-dimensional spaces. If the precision of a reversible transformation
between pure states in H5′ is sufficiently small, then this transformation, by
virtue of being an element of group of reversible transformations, will necessar-
ily be continuous, because no finite group will be available for this transforma-
tion to belong to, with a number of elements required for the carefully adjusted
precision. If further research shows that this conjecture can be carried through
and turned into a theorem, then for the first time one will have a set of algebraic
assumptions H1-H5′ that can be used to reconstruct either classical or quantum
theory, and the latter will be selected by fixing a particular value of the precision
parameter in reversible transformations between pure states. Sole`r has proved
that the topology of quantum theory can be obtained from a set of assumptions
formulated algebraically, in the case of infinite-dimensional space [51]. Hardy’s
conjecture, if proved, will show how to achieve this deduction of topology from
algebra in the case of finite-dimensional spaces. Astonishingly, in this recon-
struction program the choice between classical and quantum theory will only
depend on the value of one numeric parameter.
3.3 Rovelli’s reconstruction
The critique expressed in Section 3.2 with respect to Hardy’s continuity axiom
applies to the example of reconstruction initially proposed by Rovelli [47], that
I have developed elsewhere [17, 18]. Here, the reconstruction starts from two
information-theoretic axioms:
R1 There exists a maximum amount of relevant information that can be ex-
tracted from a system.
R2 It is always possible to obtain new information about the system.
At the first sight it seems that R1 and R2 contradict each other. Indeed,
R1 says that the quantity of information is finite, while from R2 it follows that
this quantity must be infinite, because it is always possible to obtain some new
information. The reason why there is no contradiction lies in the use of the
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term ‘relevant’ in R1, which does not appear in R2. In Rovelli’s reconstruction
relevance of new information must be judged with respect to information that
is already possessed by the observer. Bringing about new information can, not
only increase the amount of information currently available to the observer,
but also reduce it, due to the fact that some previously relevant information
may become irrelevant. Therefore, what is relevant depends on the particular
sequence of questions asked by the observer, and for a different observer a change
in the amount of information brought in by the same new piece of information
may vary. In accordance with his general relational approach, information in
Rovelli’s reconstruction should be taken as an observer-dependent, rather than
objective, notion. It is information in Shannon’s sense, that is indexed by
two indices: first related to the observed system, about which this information
has been obtained, second related to the observing system, that has obtained
information about the first system. It is impossible, in Rovelli’s view, to separate
the notion of information from its second index and to speak about objective
information independently of the observing system.
From R1 and R2, with the help of a few quantum logical assumptions, one
derives the formalism of quantum mechanics. In particular, if one postulates
that information is obtained through answers to yes-no questions that can be
asked about the system, then supplementary assumptions are that the set of such
yes-no questions forms a complete atomic orthocomplemented lattice. From
axiom R1 and a formal definition of relevance of yes-no questions with respect to
each other one derives that this lattice is orthomodular. If a further assumption
is made about the lattice of questions being isomorphic to the lattice of all
closed subspaces of a Banach space constructed over a numeric field (i.e. real
or complex numbers or quaternions), one then obtains that this Banach space
is indeed a Hilbert space. Its quantum rather than classical character follows
from axiom R2.
While the supplementary assumptions cast a shadow on the conceptual clar-
ity of the reconstruction much in the same fashion as does axiom H5 for Hardy’s
approach, the whole program presents itself differently from Hardy’s instrumen-
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talism. Mathematical derivation being still devoid of ontological commitments,
the proposed justification of the first principles does not refer to an ontology.
Rather, by reconstructing quantum theory from information-theoretic princi-
ples, we point at its epistemological character and at its role as a theory of (a
certain kind of) knowledge, one with certain limits on the kind of information
one may be dealing with. The most general theory of this kind of information
takes the form of quantum theory. Here again reconstruction appears more ap-
pealing than a mere interpretation as it leaves room for any justification of first
principles, some such justifications being possibly different from ours. Indeed,
one may equally well choose to adopt a specific ontological picture to justify
R1-R2. At the same time, regardless of a concrete philosophical justification
for first principles, the meaning of quantum theory stands clear: it is a general
theory of information constrained by several information-theoretic principles.
3.4 The CBH reconstruction
Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (CBH) propose a set of quantum informational
constraints from which one derives the basic elements of quantum theory [10].
They postulate three fundamental principles:
CBH1 No superluminal information transfer via measurement.
CBH2 No broadcasting.
CBH3 No bit commitment.
CBH argue that the meaning of axiom CBH1 is that when Alice and Bob
perform local measurements, Alice’s measurements can have no influence on
the statistics for the outcomes of Bob’s measurements, and vice versa. They
also submit that “otherwise this would mean instantaneous information transfer
between Alice and Bob” and “the mere performance of a local measurement
(in the nonselective sense) cannot, in and of itself, transfer information to a
physically distinct system.” Upon reading these statements, we feel strongly
that CBH take distinct and distant to be synonyms. Such a terminological
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identification might indeed be a tacit assumption among quantum information
theorists, whose analysis is limited to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces; but in
the full-blown C∗-algebraic framework, which CBH also employ, the meaning of
the two terms is quite different. We have here an example of the way in which
the initial quantum informational departure point of the CBH1-CBH3 principles
constrains the use of the C∗-algebraic formalism to only the situations where
these principles make sense from the point of view of quantum information; in
fact, the formalism is at the same time routinely applied to other settings as well.
Unlike Hardy’s derivation, which is independent of the particular instrumental
justification of its first principles, the CBH reconstruction cannot be carried
through outside the field of quantum information, because its mathematics,
while still valid outside this field, requires a new justificatory language. Besides
the problem of synonymy of ‘distant’ and ‘distinct,’ the quantum informational
departure point also restricts the question of time evolution. The latter is tacitly
taken by the CBH to be the usual quantum mechanical time evolution, while in
the general C∗-algebraic framework this is typically not the case and a variety
of different ‘temporal’ evolutions are available [11]. This and other problems
arising from the generality of the C∗-algebraic framework are avoided by the
CBH reconstruction at the price of confining itself to the quantum informational
setting.
Axiom CBH2 is used to establish that the C∗-algebras of Alice and Bob, A
and B, taken separately, are non-Abelian. It is interesting to note that non-
Abelianness of A and B is proved by assuming that they are kinematically
independent. This means that quantumness, of which non-Abelianness is a
necessary ingredient, is not a property of any given system taken separately, as
if it were the only physical system in the Universe; on the contrary, to be able
to derive the quantum character of the theory, one must consider the system in
the context of at least one other system that is physically distinct from the first
one. As a consequence, for example, this forbids treating the whole Universe as
a quantum system if one reconstructs quantum theory along the CBH lines.
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Axiom CBH3 entails nonlocality: spacelike separated systems must at least
sometimes occupy entangled states. It is not proved, however, that actually
instantiated states fill the space of all entangled states. CBH show that if Alice
and Bob have spacelike separated quantum systems, but cannot prepare any
entangled state, then Alice and Bob can devise an unconditionally secure bit
commitment protocol. From this theorem the authors deduce that the impos-
sibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment entails that “if each of the
pair of separated physical systems A and B has a non-uniquely decomposable
mixed state, so that A ∨ B has a pair {ρ0, ρ1} of distinct classically correlated
states whose marginals relative to A and B are identical, then A and B must be
able to occupy an entangled state that can be transformed to ρ0 or ρ1 at will
by a local operation.” The term ‘separated’ is essential and, nevertheless, its
precise meaning is not given. Once again, this can be compared to the confusion
between distinct and distant. When CBH claim that Alice and Bob represent
“spacelike separated systems,” while formally Alice and Bob are just two C∗-
algebras, one sees how the way in which CBH apply the algebraic formalism is
constrained by the context of quantum information theory. We witness here an
interesting situation in which the language and the context used to formulate
and to justify the fundamental principles set a limit on the applicability of the
mathematical formalism in which these principles are represented. Even if the
formalism can be understood more generally than within the initially chosen
disciplinary setting, one still cannot make his way out of this linguistic and
contextual prison; without the sense of the axioms being lost. If one persists
and escapes, and then obtains a new mathematical result, this result will be
void of physical meaning until a new, broader justification of the fundamental
principles has been given. Philosophical and linguistic justification, and math-
ematical derivation, play here a game of mutual onslaught and retreat which,
ultimately, leads to the advance of science, in the way described in Section 1.
Notwithstanding the difficulties with justification, the CBH result would be
a perfect example of reconstruction were it not for a great deal of mathematical
structure which is implied by the choice of the C∗-algebraic framework. The
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assumptions of the algebraic formalism include at the very least, the relations
between operators satisfying linearity, the number field being C, and the states
giving rise to the Hilbert space representation via the GNS construction. Once
one lists all such tacit supplementary assumptions, the CBH reconstruction
appears once again to suffer from the defect of incorporating a serious mathe-
matical abstraction, similar to the derivations from axioms H1-H5 or R1-R2.
3.5 Intentionally incomplete reconstructions
All reconstructions that we have discussed until now shared the goal of deriving,
at the final end, the full-blown structure of quantum theory. Recently, a new
type of information-theoretic reconstructions appeared, intentionally not aimed
at deriving the whole quantum theoretic structure [1, 2, 3, 22, 46, 50, 52]. Chris-
tened pejoratively by their own authors, these “toy models”, “fantasy quantum
mechanics,” or “quantum mechanics lite” employ a methodology of reconstruc-
tion that has been overlooked by the previous generations of researchers: it is
now claimed as helpful to reconstruct, not the full version but only a certain part
of quantum theory. One builds, therefore, a new theory which is, from the very
beginning, not intended to be the quantum theory; but this new theory allows
nevertheless to better understand the structure of the ‘true’ quantum theory.
To the same old ultimate aim of better understanding quantum mechanics toy
models provide a variety of new promising insights.
The idea of modifying usual quantum theory is not new. Nonlinear ex-
tensions of the Schro¨dinger equation have been explored by various authors
[5, 15, 56], and comprehensive reviews of these attempts can be found in [38, 53].
Nonlinear models are also sometimes analyzed in the context of quantum the-
ories more general than quantum mechanics, e.g., in quantum gravity. Inten-
tionally incomplete reconstructions, however, differ substantively from these
attempts to modify quantum theory. While the latter take standard linear
quantum mechanics to be incomplete and purport to replace it by a nonlin-
ear, more complete theory, toy models see themselves as incomplete. They do
not question the validity of quantum mechanics and do not compete with it
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in explaining empirical phenomena. Methodologically, as this is routinely em-
phasized in the opening paragraphs of articles introducing toy models, e.g., in
[3], toy models focus on important physics principles, which are upheld while
other possibilities are modified. This way the consequences of such and such
principle are investigated, independently of other principles. Thus, intentionally
incomplete reconstructions are not aimless, but allow one to achieve a better un-
derstanding of the structure of quantum theory. Incompleteness, then, becomes
a feature rather than a flaw of toy models.
Most of the existing examples of toy models are based on information-
theoretic principles. To compare the toy model with standard quantum theory,
one then asks whether the former reproduces quantum computational phenom-
ena available in the latter. Among others, such questions may include:
• Does the toy model allow superluminal signalling?
• Does the toy model allow bit commitment?
• Does the toy model allow teleportation, dense coding, or remote steering?
• Does the toy model allow exponential speed-up relative to classical com-
putation or solving NP-complete problems in polynomial time?
Other toy models are inspired by information-theoretic principles, but they are
compared with standard quantum theory in the aspects that do not necessarily
relate to computation:
• Does the toy model allow nonlocality and to what extent?
• Is the toy model contextual?
• Does the toy model possess a continuum of states, measurements and
transformations between states?
Answers given to all of these questions can be yes or no depending on the model.
Investigating then the difference between the first principles of a particular toy
model, and of standard quantum mechanics, one learns with precision which
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fundamental principle is responsible for which element of the quantum theoretic
structure. Spekkens’s toy model, for example, accommodates such quantum
phenomena as noncommutativity, interference, the multiplicity of convex de-
compositions of a mixed state, no cloning, teleportation, and others [52]. We
learn that the continuous state space, the existence of a Bell theorem, or con-
textuality, all of which are absent from this toy model, go unconnected with
the appearance of the phenomena that are reproduced. Analogously, the toy
model known as non-local, or PR, boxes [3, 46] allows non-local correlations
that are strictly stronger than those allowed by quantum mechanics, while it
only slightly modifies the quantum mechanical state space. One then sees that
non-locality is not an exclusively quantum feature and, further, that the amount
of non-locality in quantum theory is smaller than in some other theories. We
can then conjecture, for instance, that the ‘true’ quantum theory has as much
non-locality as it does, and not more or less, due to the continuum of states and
to reversible transformations between pure states, both of these being left out
of the PR boxes toy model.
These examples show how one obtains the deeper insight into the structure
of quantum theory and therefore achieves what was initially promised by the
program of intentionally incomplete reconstruction. Toy models, although in-
complete, form a very fertile class of reconstructions. Their recent advent in
the area of the foundations of quantum theory manifests the fact that the shift
from interpretation of quantum theory to its reconstruction gave birth, in this
area, to many a new, previously non-existent idea.
4 Conclusion
We have argued that reconstruction is the exclusive way to make things clear
about quantum mechanics. As such, this idea is not novel but has been in the
air for some time, and a concise statement can for example be found in Rovelli
[47],
Quantum mechanics will cease to look puzzling only when we will
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be able to derive the formalism of the theory from a set of sim-
ple physical assertions (“postulates,” “principles”) about the world.
Therefore, we should not try to append a reasonable interpretation
to the quantum mechanical formalism, but rather to derive the for-
malism from a set of experimentally motivated postulates.
What is novel, however, is that an increasing number of researchers work nowa-
days on reconstructing quantum theory, and the time is ripe to promote this
general framework to the status of a widely accepted paradigmatic shift in the
body of work in the foundations of physics.
Reconstruction brings in clarity to where interpretation was struggling to
make sense of a physical theory. What belongs to physical theory is no more
than what is needed for its derivation. All other questions belong to metathe-
ory and are related to the metatheoretic justification task for the choice of first
principles. However, completely reconstructing quantum theory remains only a
partially solved problem. Notwithstanding, reconstruction has been successfully
competing with more traditional interpretations, due to its appealing concep-
tual transparency and to the clarity that it brings into the structure of the
theory. It would be too ambitious to expect that all of modern quantum theory,
including field theory and quantum gravity, could be derived from a few axioms.
In other words, none of the reconstructions that have been proposed until now
is complete, and some are intentionally incomplete. Although to a varying de-
gree, mathematical abstraction is a necessity for each of the currently existing
reconstructions. However, if we want to understand the meaning of even most
advanced parts of quantum theory, and to reach a consensus in this understand-
ing, it is then inevitable that simple physical principles be formulated and put
in the very foundation of quantum theory.
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